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Abstract
Digital  identity  management  intra  and  inter  
information  systems,  and,  service  oriented  
architectures  security,  are  the  roots  of  identity  
federation. This kind of security architectures aims  
at enabling information systems interoperability. 
Existing architectures, however, do not consider  
interoperability  of  heterogeneous  federation  
architectures. 
In  this  paper,  we  try  to  initiate  an  in-depth 
reflection  on this issue, through the comparison of  
two  main  federation  architecture  specifications:  
SAML and WS-Federation.
Firstly, we propose an overall outline of identity  
federation.  We  furthermore  address  the  issue  of  
different  federation  architectures  interoperability.  
Afterwards,  we  compare  SAML2  and  WS-
Federation1.1B. Eventually, we give a way to make  
them interoperate. 
1. Introduction
Information systems interconnection is a favored 
way to share digital resources between institutional 
or business partners. One of the main point of this 
interconnection  is  how to  control  resource  access 
thereby implying the identity management systems 
interoperability.  To  a  large  extend,  identity 
federation  offers  a  solution,  opening  the  way  to 
connect information systems security domains.
Two  architectures  emerged  from  web 
technologies   through  successive  evolutions,  and 
became  major  identity  federation  architectures: 
SAML and WS-Federation.
In  this  paper,  we  address  the  case  of  the 
interoperability  between  these  two  architectures. 
Firstly,  we  propose  an  overall  outline  of  identity 
federation.  Then,  we  discuss  about  the 
interconnection  of  identity  federation  architectures 
coming  from  heterogeneous  specifications. 
Afterwards,  we  compare  SAML2  and  WS-
Federation1.1B. Eventually,  we define the ways of 
convergence, and therefore, of interoperability.
2. Trust outline
Identity  federation  consists  in  defining  an 
identity  information  transport  architecture  to 
retrieve  the  clearance  of  access  from  the  security 
domain  the  requesting  digital  identity  belongs  to. 
This is based on trust  architectures.   Their  origins 
come from three issues:
 The  multitude  of  administrative 
processes within identity  management 
architectures  (Authentication, 
Authorization,  Accounting  and 
Auditing   AAAA).
 Identity  management  between 
information systems.
 Web  service  oriented  architectures 
security.
2.1. Administrative task delegation
The  situation,  where  each  application  is  in 
charge  of  processing  every  administrative  task  of 
identity  management,  creates  many  factors  that 
potentially  compromise  the  information  system 
security.  One  of  them  is  the  multitude  of 
authentication  processes  requiring  each  time 
credential  reemissions over  networks.  Single  sign-
on architectures based on authentication delegation 
to  trusted  third parties  overcome  this  issue  [1][2]. 
The authentication delegation principle can be first 
attributed to the Kerberos architecture[3]. This type 
of  architectures  relies  on  trust  links  establishment 
between  service  providers  and  administrative 
authorities.  Trust  linked  entities  form  a  circle  of 
trust at the heart of which service providers accept 
claims  made  by  administrative  authorities.  In 
practice,  it  implies  secrets  shared  among  entities 
aiming at signing their assertions, which often relies 
on public key infrastructure.  
2.2. The opening of information systems
The  opening  of  information  systems  makes 
internal  resources  available  to  external  parties, 
human  beings  or  standalone  applications. 
Administrative  load  of  multiple  identity 
management  systems,  and  related  financial  costs, 
prevent  information  systems  to  directly  include 
identity management systems of external parties. In 
other  words,  the  main  point  is  to  use  existing 
identities,  so  far  as  obtaining  the  most  relevant 
information,  rather than creating new identities for 
each application.  As a matter of fact,  this opening 
must go hand in hand with the opening of identity 
management  systems  and  their  interconnection. 
Trust  links  establishment  between  information 
systems also overcomes this issue. 
Generally, each information system belongs to a 
distinct  organizational  entity  (firm,  institution, 
etc...).  Thus, the concept of federation makes sense 
for  information  systems  interconnection.  In  a  first 
time, various entities formalize their partnership to 
make up a federation. They therefore  define their 
common  identity  management  policies  which  are 
afterwards  carried  out  into  the  federation 
architecture.
2.3. Service oriented architectures security
Software  interconnection  inside  or  between 
information  systems,  also  as  the  conception  of 
software spread over multiple information systems, 
cause complex trouble for identity management.  It 
means to ensure secured exchanges and to manage 
identities  of  standalone  applications  at  the  same 
time.  Identity  federation  architectures  are  service 
oriented  architectures  which  is  an  identity 
management  security  layer  bound to  third  service 
oriented architectures. Hence, applicative messages 
exchanges depend on decisions taken at this security 
layer and are secured through security informations 
inserted in their headers at this security layer too.
3. Federation architecture
This  section  deals  with  the  overall  aspects  of 
federation architectures.
3.1. Security information
The three points defined in section 2 rely on the 
circulation of security informations about identities 
inside  or  across  security  domains.  These 
informations can be:
 descriptives (credentials and attributes)
 resulting  of  identity  administrative 
processes.
3.2.  Trust  architectures  and  information 
security lifecycle
Trust  architectures  rely  on  trust  links 
establishment based on shared secrets bound to sign 
security informations. The trust architectures are in 
charge  of  defining  the  lifecycle  of  the  security 
informations.  The  trust  architectures  allow  the 
conception  of  various  trust  topologies  based  on 
direct  and indirect  trust links and ensure messages 
security.
3.3.  Identity  federation:  entity  roles  and 
profiles
Federation  architectures  rely  on  trust 
architectures  in  order  to  transport  and  manage 
security  informations.  They therefore  extend those 
architectures  for  defining  the  federation  functions, 
hence administrative  tasks delegation and how the 
security  informations  must  be  employed.  The 
federation  architectures  define  the  roles  of  the 
entities  taking  part  into  federation.  Finally,  a 
federation  architecture  must  provide  a  way  to  be 
deployed  using  existing  applicative  transport 
protocols.
3.4. Clients
The  federation  architectures  have  to  take  into 
account  the  different  interactions  of  a  user  or  a 
standalone  application  with  the  identity 
management layer. It means two types of clients:
 web browsers, passive relays of applicative 
messages;
 enhanced  clients,  user  interfaces  or 
standalone  applications,  being  able  to 
directly interact  with the entities members 
of  the  federation  architecture,   that  is  to 
say,  being  able  to  consume  identity  web 
services.
4. Interoperability of heterogeneous 
federation architectures
The federation architectures enables services for 
identities  of  a  third  security  domain.  The  service 
providers  consume  informations  provided  by 
authorities with which they share direct  or indirect 
trust links. As a consequence, the main point treated 
in  this  paper  is  how  to  make  a  service  provider 
consume  security  informations  provided  by  an 
authority  issued  from  a  different  specification.  In 
this section,  we care  about  the entity  in charge of 
the interoperability processes.
If  service  providers  and  authorities  of  different 
specifications  are  directly  connected  through  trust 
links,  they  will  be  responsible  for  the 
interoperability processes. Two possibilities: 
 If  the  federation  architecture  topology  is 
authority-centered,  the  authority  is  in 
charge  of  ensuring  interoperability  (cf. 
fig1).
fig 1. Responsibility of interoperability in a  
federation architecture topology authority-centered  
with direct trust links.
 If  the  federation  architecture  topology  is 
service  provider-centered,  the  service 
provider  is  in  charge  of  ensuring 
interoperability (cf. fig2). 
fig 2. Responsibility of interoperability in a  
federation architecture topology service provider-
centered with direct trust links.
Nevertheless, in more complex topologies, where 
circles  of  trust  include  multiple  authorities  and 
service  providers,  it  is  interesting  to  assign  the 
responsibility of the interoperability processes to a 
dedicated third party. Entities issued from different 
specifications  can  interoperate  without  being 
modified thanks to the third party.  As a matter  of 
fact,  they  must  be  indirectly  trust  linked  by  the 
dedicated third party (cf. fig3). 
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fig 3. Responsibility of interoperability in a complex  
federation architecture topology allowing indirect  
trust links.
5.  Interoperability  between  SAML2  et 
WS-Federation1.1B
We  illustrate  the  description  made  in  the 
previous section with a study on the SAML2[4] and 
the  WS-Federation1.1B[5][6]  specifications.  The 
purpose  is  to  determine  the  necessary 
interoperability  processes  and  the  ways  for 
implementing  the  dedicated  third  party  previously 
described.  In other words, the goal of this section is 
to define how a SAML2 service provider can obtain 
and  consume  a  security  information  issued  by  a 
WS-Federation 1.1B authority. And inversely, with 
a  WS-Federation  service  provider  and  a  SAML2 
authority.  This  section  is  organized  as  follow. 
Firstly,  we  present  the  specifications.  Next,  we 
compare  SAML2 and WS-Federation1.1B.  Finally, 
we propose our solution to make them interoperate.
5.1. Specifications outline
The OASIS1 consortium, with the SAML norm, 
and the Liberty  Alliance  consortium,  with the  ID-
FF2 spécifications based on SAML 1.1,  worked on 
closed federation architecture which resulted in the 
proposal of SAML2. 
The  WS-I3 consortium  developed  a  federation 
architecture named WS-Federation which relies on 
other  specifications,  mainly  WS-Trust[7]  and WS-
Security[8], both normalized by the OASIS. 
5.2.  Comparison  between  SAML2  et  WS-
Federation1.1B
5.2.1. Technical comparison
This  comparison  is  provided  in  Tab1  for 
readability purpose.
5.2.2. Discussion
In  the  rest  of  this  paper,  we  will  refer  to  the 
authority  producer  of  security  informations  as 
Identity Provider (henceforth IP) and to the security 
informations  consumer  as  Service  Provider 
(henceforth SP).
SAML2 was initially conceived to answer to the 
single sign-on issue within a federation architecture. 
Implied applications were mainly web ones. That is 
the reason why  the architecture was designed for a 
passive  client  (a  web  browser).  The  protocol 
messages exchanges are always triggered by the SP 
when  it  needs  to  establish  a  security  context. 
SAML2 provides a baseline set  of profiles  for the 
use  of  assertions  and  protocols  to  accomplish 
specific uses cases. The protocols used imply which 
statements will be contained into the assertions. The 
web browser as a user interface cause the transport 
to be based on HTTP 1.1, and lead the client to be a 
passive relay of protocol messages. Direct protocol 
messages exchanges between an asserting party and 
a relying one are done in SOAP.
SAML  provides  an  enhanced  client  profile 
(SAML ECP) which defines how a web active client 
should  take  part  in   the  SAML message  protocol 
exchanges. The SP is still the trigger of the protocol 
messages  exchanges.  Hence,  when  the  client 
requests  a  service  access  and  the  SP  requires  a 
security  context,  it  returns  a  SOAP request  in  the 
HTTP  response  (« PAOS binding/protocol »).  The 
client is then in charge of treating the SOAP request 
containing an SAML authentication request  signed 
by the SP. The SP gives in the SOAP header his list 
of trusted IP. The client  selects one and submits it 
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the  authentication  request  with  a  new  SOAP 
request.  If  the  selected  IP  has  not  already 
established a security context,  or the SP forces the 
reauthentication, the client authenticates against the 
IP.  The  IP  delivers  the  assertion  containing  the 
authentication  statement.  The  client  returns  the 
assertion to the SP in a SOAP response in a HTTP 
request  (« PAOS  binding/protocol »).  The  SP 
establishes  the  security  context  for  the  user  and 
delivers the resource initially requested. 
The WS-Federation trust architecture is based on 
WS-Trust  specifications.  WS-Trust  was  initially 
conceived for the security of web services oriented 
architectures. WS-Trust provides an architecture for 
an active client, the requestor, actor of the protocol 
messages  exchanges.  It  is  in  charge  of  triggering 
these exchanges. The requestor can be an enhanced 
web browser,  as  a  user  interface,  or  a  standalone 
web service client.  WS-Trust defines a protocol of 
exchanges  between  requestors  and  security  token 
servers allowing to manage the token lifecycle. WS-
Trust relies on WS-Security specifications to ensure 
protocol message security and to provide a way to 
describe  security  informations.  WS-Federation 
defines  various  profiles  of  STS  according  to  the 
type  of  tokens  they  are  able  to  deliver: 
Authentication,  Autorization,  Attributes  and 
Pseudonyms. It is important to notice that the WS-
Trust protocol, unlike SAML, is generalist and does 
not  provide  specialized  requests  according  to  the 
types  of  tokens  required.  WS-Federation  also 
provides a model  where each  web service  uses its 
own  WSDL  file.  It  defines  the  service  federation 
capabilities  and  the  security  requirements  through 
the  integration  of  a  document  named  policy 
respecting  the  WS-SecurityPolicy  format.  The 
federation  capabilities  are  named  federation 
metadatas  and describe the SOAP endpoint  on the 
web service. The requirements defined by the policy 
indicate  the  claims  the  requestor  will  have  to 
present in his requests to obtain the service access. 
Reciprocally, the requestor deduces from the policy 
the claims it has to obtain from the IP/STS. 
WS-Federation provides a passive client profile. 
Initially,  the requestor  was in charge  of triggering 
the  WS-Trust  protocol  messages  exchanges.  The 
passive  client  profile  lets  the  SP  trigger  the 
exchanges, like in SAML. Not only the SP must be 
aware of the claims it requires, but it also becomes 
the  requestor.  Which  consequently  leads  to  the 
definition of a protocol with specialized requests. 
The  SAML  request  relaying,  named  SAML 
proxying,  and  the  token  exchange  in  WS-
Federation, are the basis for the  deployment of trust 
architectures  made  of  indirect  trust  links  between 
producers  of  security  informations  and  their 
consumers.  Indirect  trust  links  allows  the  IP 
chaining and hence, hierarchical trust architectures. 
The  third  party  responsible  of  the  interoperability 
processes  described  in  this  paper  relies  on  this 
capability.
Tab 1. Comparative tableau of SAML2 and WS-Federation1.1B
SAML2 WS-Federation1.1.B
Semantic Asserting party or identity provider Secutity token server or identity provider
Assertion consumer or relying party or service provider Relying party or ressource provider
Principal Principal
Passive client Web browser Web browser requestor
Active client Enhanced client or enhanced proxy Web service requestor
Label Assertion Security token
Specifications Assertions and protocols for the OASIS SAML v2.
XML schema namespace urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion
Description Three kinds of security tokens:
. authentication, . binary,
. autorization decisions, . XML (e.g: SAML assertion).
. attributes.
Dynamic Dynamic with the WS-MetadataExchange protocol [9]
Pseudonimity[10][11] It exists two formats of identifiers ensuring privacy: WS-Federation offers two equivalent pseudonym mecanisms: 
Specifications Assertions and protocols for the OASIS SAML v2.0 WS-Trust 1.3
XML schema namespace urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512
Request type
Passive client SP SP. Two possibilities to the SP for requesting the IP: 
. With a set of URL parameters.
. With a WS-Trust request.
Active client SP Active client
Authorization
Trust architecture
Authority producer of 
security informations (IP)
Security informations 
consumer (SP)
Subject of the security 
information
Security 
Information Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security1.1 (WS-
Security 2004)
http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-
wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd
Contains statements made by an Issuer about a Subject. Three 
kinds of assertion statements:
. « username », 
Contains a collection of « claims ».
Provisionning of federation metadatas 
(used to diffuse public keys and to 
describe endpoint references of  federation 
services)
. The transient identifier is a temporary pair-wise 
pseudonym.  It usually changes at each user session and is 
different for each link between IP and SP.
. The pair-wise identifier, equivalent as the persistent one of  
SAML.
. The persistent identifier is a persistent pair-wise 
pseudonym different for each link betwen IP and SP. As 
the transient one, it prevents the discovery of the subject's 
identity or activity, but it allows account linking (aka 
identity mapping).
. A transient identifier coupled with a pseudonym registring 
service allowing the account linking
Protocol 
messages
The request type depends on the security information type 
expected. In other words, the request type employed depends 
on the profile used. Inversely, the statements contained in 
assertion depend on the request type employed.
WS-Trust provides a single type of request. The claims 
contained in security token depends on the claims required by 
the SP. The requirements of the SP are defined in a policy. The 
policy format must respect  the WS-SecurityPolicy[12] format.
Trigger of 
protocol 
messages 
exchanges
Authorizations management is not included in SAML 
anymore. XACML issued by the OASIS provides an 
authorization architecture. The XACML authorization 
statements can be conveyed in attributes statements of SAML 
assertions as it is defines in the XACML attribute profile.
WS-SecurityPolicy offers a way to define policy for each 
entity of a WS-Federation architecture. It constitutes the 
authorization architecture of WS-Federation.
An IP can act as an authentication request relay. In other 
words, if it can not satisfy a request, it can request by itself 
another IP to satisfy the initial request and acts as an assertion 
consummer, as an SP usually acts. In fact, it keeps the 
assertion as is and resigns it. This mechanism has been 
conceived for a passive client but works as well for an active 
client. The IP returns a SOAP request instead of a SOAP 
response, and the client submit the SOAP request to another 
IP. 
Once the client has determined the claims required by the SP 
and if  the IP implied is different from the IP affiliated to the 
SP, it obtains the token from the IP and exchanges it to the IP 
affiliated to the ressource. With the passive client profile,like 
with SAML, the SP redirects the web browser to its IP which 
redirect to the IP deduced from the principal. 
5.3. Interoperability and passive client
The interoperability  processes are fundamentaly 
the same for a passive or an active client. Therefore, 
we  will  illustrate  our  proposition  with  an 
architecture based on a passive client.
5.3.1 Existing works
At  the  present  day,  we  did  not  found  any  full 
implementations of the passive or active profiles of 
WS-Federation1.1B.  The  ADFSv1  on  Windows 
Server  2003  R2  is  an  implementation  of  the 
interoperability  profile  which  is  a  subset  of  the 
passive  profile  of  WS-Federation1.0.  Works  were 
conducted  to make it  interoperate  with Shibboleth 
v1.3f. based on SAML1.1[13]. These works lead to 
the  elaboration  of  a  Shibboleth  extension  module. 
The extension module is installed directly on the SP 
or IP which needs interoperability. The IP proxying 
is not supported by Shibboleth v1.3f which inhibits 
the  possibility  of  implementating  a  third  party 
dedicated to the interoperability.
This interoperability architecture is based on the 
conversion  of  the  SAML  requests  in  the  WS-
Federation passive requestor interoperability profile 
equivalent  requests.  More  precisely,  the  XML 
documents corresponding to the SAML requests and 
responses  are  respectively  converted  in  URL 
parameters  and  in  a 
<wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> WS-Trust 
document. 
5.3.2 Principle
The  WS-Federation  passive  requestor  profile 
specifications  provide  two  ways  for  the  SP  to 
request the IP:
 Through a set of URL parameters. The way 
exploited  in  the  interoperability 
ADFS/Shibboleth previously described.
 Through  a  WS-Trust  request  document 
given  by  the  SP  to  the  IP  into  a  URL 
parameter.
The second way seems to be the most interesting 
for  us  in  the  perspective  of  implementing  the 
interoperability  of  the  WS-Federation  passive 
profile with the SAML profiles in a dedicated third 
party.
Hence, the main task will result in translating: 
 A  WS-Trust  <wst:RequestSecurityToken> 
document in SAML request documents, for 
example   <samlp:AuthnRequest>,  and 
inversely. 
 A  WS-Trust 
<wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> 
document in a SAML  <samlp:Response>, 
and inversely.
The third party dedicated to the interoperability 
will  be  in  charge  of  performing  these 
transformations and to resign them to establish the 
indirect trust link. We illustrate this principle for the 
authentication delegation profiles.
5.3.3. Transport  
In both WS-Federation and SAML, the client  is 
redirected  by  the  SP to  an  IP  with  a  HTTP  302 
error.  The  authentication  request  is transmitted  by 
the following URL parameters:
 For  SAML:  parameter   SAMLRequest 
containing  an  XML  document  of 
<samlp:AuthnRequest> type.
 For  WS-Federation:  parameter  wa 
containing  the  wsignin1.0 value  and 
parameter  wreq containing  an  XML 
document  of  <wst:SecurityTokenRequest> 
WS-Trust type. 
A valid authentication response is conveyed by a 
HTTP POST with the following parameters:
 For  SAML:  parameter  SAMLResponse 
containing an SAML assertion.
 For  WS-Federation:  parameter  wresult 
contaning  an  XML  document  of 
<wst:SecurityTokenRequestResponse> 
WS-Trust  type  which  itself  contains  an 
SAML assertion.
5.3.4. The request
The objective here is to convert a SAML request 
in a WS-Trust request.
5.3.4.1. SAML « AuthnRequest »
As we mentioned in 5.2., WS-Trust requests are 
generalist.  Therefore,  it is necessary to translate in 
WS-Trust the fact that the information expected as a 
response  for  a  <samlp:AuthnRequest> SAML 
request  must  be  the  result  of  an  authentication 
process.  
Hence,  the  <samlp:AuthnRequest> SAML 
request  is  converted  in  the 
<wst:RequestSecurityToken> WS-Trust  request 
containing the following element:
<wst:RequestType>http://docs.oasis-
open.org/ws-sx/ws-
trust/200512/Issue</wst:RequestType>
Furthermore,  the  token  type  expected  for  the 
response  is  an  assertion.  The  request  must  also 
contain the following element:
<wst:TokenType>  urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:
2.0:assertion </wst:TokenType>.
5.3.4.2. The subject name
A  <samlp:AuthnRequest> SAML  request 
contains  the  element  <samlp:NameIDPolicy> 
indicating the type of subject name expected in the 
response.  It  can  be  translated  by  a  request  of  an 
authorization claim of the same type. For example 
with an email address, we obtain these two requests: 
 <samlp:authnRequest>:
<samlp:NameIDPolicy  
Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-
format:emailAddress" </samlp:NameIDPolicy>
 <wst:SecurityTokenRequest>: 
<wst:Claims 
Dialect= http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2006/12/a
uthorization/authclaims ><auth:ClaimType  
Uri="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-
format:emailAddress" /> </wst:Claims>
5.3.4.3. Authentication level
An SAML SP indicates within an authentication 
request  the  authentication  context  expected  using 
the  <samlp:RequestedAuthnContext> element. 
SAML  provides  25  authentication  context  XML 
schemas. 
In  a  WS-Trust  request,  it  is  done  with  a 
<wst:authenticationType> element  for which a set 
of values are defined by WS-Federation.
The  WS-Federation  defined  values  are  less 
numerous  than  the  SAML  authentication  context 
schemas.  However,  a  WS-Federation 
implementation  can  take  in  charge  some  of  the 
SAML authentication context schema to ensure the 
interoperability  for  the  missing  WS-Federation 
authentication context.
5.3.5. The response
The objective is to translate a SAML response in 
a WS-Trust response. 
The  token  type  expected  in  the 
<wst:SecurityTokenRequestResponse> WS-Trust 
response is a SAML assertion.  The third party will 
have  to  extract,  to  resign  and  to  reformat  it  in  a 
<samlp:Response> SAML response.  
5.3.6. Generalization
We have settled for explaining the principle  on 
which  we  based  the  interoperability  between 
SAML2  and  WS-Federation1.1B.  To  specify 
precisely  this  interoperability,  it  is  necessary  to 
apply this principle to convert each SAML requests 
and  responses in WS-Trust requests and responses 
and  inversely.  Many  more  parameters  than  those 
previously  cited  have  to  be  taken  in  account,  eg, 
parameters about the information security lifetime.
To  provide  attributes  in  cross-federation,  it  is 
also  necessary  to  define  a  common  namespace. 
WS-Federation  offers  a  very  limited  claim 
namespace  based  on  the  non-normative  document 
« Passive  Requestor  Interoperability  Profile » [14]. 
SAML  provides  five  attributes  profiles:  basic, 
X500/LDAP, UUID, DCE PAC et XACML.
For  ensuring  privacy,  it  needs  to  make 
interoperate  the  pseudonyms  systems,  ie,  the 
dedicated  STS for  WS-Federation,  and  the  use  of 
transcient and persistent pseudonyms for SAML. 
Finally,  it  does  not  exist  a  dynamic  metadatas 
discovering service in SAML. It can be considered 
as the least common denominator and thus, the trust 
links will have to be pre-established with the third 
party.
The interoperability with active clients profiles is 
based on the same principle except that the client is 
also  active  in  the  interoperability  processes.  Not 
because  it  plays  a  role  in  XML  document  and 
protocol messages conversions, but it has indeed to 
support  the  transport  protocols  of  both  WS-
Federation and SAML ECP profile specifications. 
6. Conclusion
The  federation  architectures  are  still  evolving. 
Nevertheless, overall trends emerge and converge to 
the interoperability of heterogeneous architectures. 
The  « Identity  2.0 »  philosophy  places  the 
user/consumer  at  the  heart  of  the  exchanges 
concerning his identity.  This perfectly corresponds 
to  active  clients  federation  architectures:  the 
requestor of WS-Trust, the SAML ECP profile, and 
the  Active  Client  in  the  Liberty  Alliance  ID-
WSF2.0 specifications. A main feature of the active 
client is to provide attributes by his own. It is also a 
better  experience  for a user in the management  of 
his identities. The result of the exposed work leads 
to think that active clients are the main convergence 
point of the federation architectures.
From the basis  settled  in this  paper,  our  future 
works  could  be  to  propose  a  model  of 
interoperability between SAML and WS-Federation 
and an associated implementation.
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